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ABSTRACT
This paper deals with the design of the secure blockchain network framework
to prevent damages from an attacker. The decentralized network design
called the  is a new hybrid theoretical modelBlockchain Governance Game
and it provides the stochastic game framework to find best strategies towards
preparation for preventing a network malfunction by an attacker. Analytically
tractable results are obtained by using the fluctuation theory and the mixed
strategy game theory. These results enable to predict the moment for
operations and deliver the optimal portion of backup nodes to protect the
blockchain network. This research helps for whom considers the initial con
offering or launching new blockchain based services with enhancing the
security features.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The cryptocurrencies (coins and tokens) are the collection of concepts and
technologies that form the basis of a digital money ecosystem (Antonopoulos, 2017).
Units of currency called coins (or tokens) are used to store and transmit value among
participants in the blockchain network. The Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency based
on the blockchain which has been proposed by Satoshi (Nakamoto, 2009) who is a
founder of the Bitcoin. A blockchain is a growing list of records which are linked
using cryptography. After establishing the Bitcoin, many cryptocurrencies including
the Ethereum (Wood, 2018) have been developed based on the Blockchain technology
(Kim, 2018b). Although blockchain records are not unalterable, blockchains could be
considered as highly secure by design and exemplify a distributed computing system
(Luu, Teutsch and et. al., 2015). One of strength of blockchain is the decentralized
peer-to-peer network which eliminates a number of security risks that come with data
being held centrally. A vital concern in the Bitcoin is the prevention of unauthorized
double-spending. An unknown user by using large amounts of hash power could try to
use the 51 percent attack to perform double spending to steal money from exchanges
(Garay, Kiayias and et. al., 2015). Decentralized consensus has been claimed with a
blockchain and we have observed the intensive attacks which are dedicated for
decentralized networks (i.e., Blockchain networks). The 51 percent attack is one of
typical attacks by generating blocks with false information of transactions because of
this genie strength of the Blockchain (Beikverdi and Song, 2015; Yli-Huumo, Ko and
et. al., 2016). The Ethereum has some improvements in terms of managing the
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2authorization of funds and authenticating external entities (Hirai, 2017). But current
blockchain based cryptocurrencies including the Ethereum are not fully safe from the
51 percent attack especially related with the mining computation. Because of this
reason, a private blockchain has been proposed for business or government uses (Kim,
2018a; Narayanan and Clar, 2017) and this type of Blockchain networks can be
considered as a middle-ground for companies and governments (Weiss and Corsi,
2018). Although many peoples are interested in the private Blockchain technology in
general but they are not comfortable with a level of control compare to the offered
control level from a public decentralized network (Kim, 2018a). In addition, even the
control levels for a private blockchain network should be minimal to keep the
strengths of a decentralized network for avoiding all security matters what atypical
centralized network has.
Recent researchers have improved the securities in the protocol levels and some
researches have proposed the new protocol to prevent the 51 percent attack (Decker
and Wattenhofer, 2013; Eyal and Sirer, 2014; Garay, Kiayias and Leonardos, 2015;
Luu and et. al., 2015). The blockchain protocol requires to solve a POW (Proof-Of-
Work), which essentially amounts to brute-forcing a hash inequality based on SHA-
256 to create new blockchain blocks (Garay, Kiayias and Leonardos, 2015) and
hashcash which has been originally used for preventing the denial of service attack
(DoS) has been applied for the POW algorithm in the Blockchain protocol (Back,
2002) and the POW algorithm also has been improved for protecting the decentralized
network from attacks (Laurie and Clayton, 2004; Poelstra, 2015). These protocol
improvements might prevent the 51 percent attack but most solutions are limited
because the implementations are robust by arbitrarily choosing the boundaries (Eyal
and Sirer, 2014; Garay, Kiayias and Leonardos, 2015). Unfortunately, a thorough
analysis for establishing the exact security properties (i.e., the optimized boundaries)
of the Blockchain system has not been established yet.
The  is newly proposed in the paper. The Blockchain Governance Game Blockchain
Governance Game (BGG) is the stochastic game model with the fluctuation and the
mixed strategy game for analyzing the network to provide the decision making
moment for taking preliminary security actions before attacks. The model is targeted
to prevent blockchain based attacks (i.e., the 51 percent attack) and keeps the network
decentralized. Atypical case that an attacker to trying to build an alternative
blockchain (blockchain forks) faster than regular miners (Nakamoto, 2009) is
considered in BGG. The defender (or the controller) only manages the small
percentage of nodes which are released prior the attack is happened. The results are
given as joint functionals between two players of the predicted time of the first
observed threshold which is crossing the half of the total nodes (i.e., 51 percents)
along with values of each component upon this time.
2. S M F B NTOCHASTIC ODEL OR LOCKCHAIN ETWORK
2.1 Basic Stochastic Model
The antagonistic game of two players (called "A" and "H") are introduced to describe
the blockchain network between a defender and an attacker. Both players compete to
build the blocks either for honest or false ones. Let ( , ,  be probability spaceS Y Sa b TÑ
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are -measurable and -measurable marked Poisson processes (  is a point massY Y &E L +
at ) with respective intensities  and  and point independent marking. These two+ - -E L
values are related with the computing performance for generating blocks for attackers
and honest nodes in the blockchain network. They will represent the actions of player
A (an attacker) and H (an honest node). Player A builds the blocks with false
transactions (e.g., double spend) at times   and sustain respective build the= ß = ßá" #
blocks of magnitudes   formalized by the process . The building blocks to\ ß \" #ß á T
player H are described by the process  similarly. Player H will generate the blocks[
which contain the correct transactions. Both players races to build their blocks (either
honest or false). The processes  and  are specified by their transformsT [
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The game is observed at random times in accordance with the point process which is
equivalent with the duration of the PoW (Proof-of-Work) completion (around 10
minutes in the Bitcoin) in the blockchain network (Kim, 2018a):
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By using the double expectation,
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stochastic process  describing the evolution of a conflict between players AT [7 7Œ
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than the half of the total nodes . To further formalize the game, the  isQ  exit index
introduced:
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Since, an attacker is win at time  otherwise an honest node generates the correct7/ ß
blocks. We shall be targeting the confined game in the view point of player A. The
first passage time  is the associated exit time from the confined game and the7/
formula (2.6) will be modified as
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which the path of the game from , which gives an exact definition ofY S / .a b e f 
the model observed until The joint functional of the blockchain network model is7/ Þ
as follows:
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where  indicates the total number of nodes (or ledgers) in the blockchain network.Q
This functional will represent the status of attackers and honest nodes upon the exit
time  The latter is of particular interest, we are interested in not only the prediction7/ Þ
of catching up the blocks by attackers but also one observation prior to this. The
Theorem 1 (BGG-1) establishes an explicit formula  from (2.11)-(2.13). The firstQQ
#
exceed model by Dshahalow (1995) has been adopted and its operators are defined as
follows:
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Theorem 1 (BGG-1): the functional  of the process  of (2.17) satisfies followingQQ
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From (2.17) and (2.35), we can find the PGFs (probability generating functions) of
E E/ /" (and ) and the :exit index
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The moment of making a decision  could be found from (2.4), (2.10) and (2.36):7/"
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3. B G M G SLOCKCHAIN OVERNANCE IXED AME TRATEGY
3.1 Preliminaries
Let us consider a two-person mixed strategy game, and player H (i.e., a defender) is
the person who has two strategies at the observation moment, one step before
attackers complete to generate alternative chains with dishonest transactions (double
spending). Player H has the following strategies: (1) doing nothing,DoNothing 
which implicates that the blockchain networks are running as usual, and (2)
Action  taking the preliminary action for avoiding attacks by adding honest nodes. In
the view of player A (an attacker), he might succeed to catch the blocks or fail to catch
(i.e., the Blockchain network has been defended). Therefore, the responses of player A
would be either "Not burst" or "Burst." Let us assume that the cost for reserving the
additional honest nodes is  where  is the portion to reserve the blocks for-! !
defending the Blockchain network. The token provider might reserve the certain
portion of nodes for protecting the values and the network. If the attacks succeed to
generate alternative blocks, the network bursts and the whole value of the tokens (or
coins)  will be lost and this value might be equivalent with the value by ICO (InitialF
Coin Offering). It still has the chance to burst although the defender (or the provider)
adds the honest nodes before catching blocks by the attacker. In this case, the cost will
be not only the token value but also the reservation cost for additional honest nodes.
The normal form of games is as follows:
6          . Players:            3.1R œ ß ße f a bA L
          . Strategy sets:
                                    =E œ ß ße f" " " "NotBurst Burst
                                    =L œ ß Þe f" " " "DoNothing Action
Based on the above conditions, the general cost matrix at the prior time to be burst
7/"could be composed as follows:
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Table 1. Cost matrix
where  is the probability of bursting blockchain network (i.e., an attacker wins; =a bL
the game) and it depends on the strategic decision of player H (a defender):
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It is noted that the cost for the reserved nodes (i.e., "Action" strategy of player H)
should be smaller than the other strategy. Otherwise, player H does not have to spend
the cost of the governance protection. The portion of reserved nodes for protecting a
blockchain network  depends on the cost function and the optimal portion for the!
blockchain governance  could be found as follows:!‡
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3.2 Blockchain Governance Game
We would like to design the enhanced blockchain network governance that can take
the action at the decision making moment . The governance in the blockchain is7/"
followed by the decision making parameter. It also means that we will not take any
action until the time  and it still have the chance that all nodes are governed by an7/"
attacker if the attacker catches more than the half of nodes at  (i.e., .7/ /" " Q#˜ ™E  
If the attacker catches the less than half of all nodes at  (i.e., , then7/ /" " Q#˜ ™E 
the defender could take the action to avoid the attack at  The total cost for7/ Þ
developing the enhanced blockchain network is as follows:
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4. S C : M O PPECIAL ASE  EMORYLESS BSERVATION ROCESS
It is assumed that the observation process has the memoryless properties which might
be a special condition but very practical for actual implementation on a blockchain
governance. It implies that the defender (or a service provider) does not spend
additional cost of storing the past information. To build the cost function of the
blockchain governance, we can find explicit solutions of  ;!, :E"  and the moment of
the decision making after finding the first exceed index , the probability„ /c d
(generating function) of the number of blocks at the moment   7/ Š ‹„’ “1"E/  and
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It is also noted that the formulas (2.11)-(2.14) could be rewritten as follows:
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4.1. The Marginal Mean upon 7/"
The marginal mean of  is the moment of the decision making for taking the prior7/"
action to prevent the attack and it could be straight forward once the exit index is
found. The  could be found fexit index rom (2.29)-(2.34), (2.36) and (4.7)-(4.18):
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Since, the observation process has the memoryless properties, the process is
exponentially distributed and the functionals from (4.7)-(4.12) are as follows:
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4.2. The Marginal Transform upon E/"
The number of blocks which governed by an attacker at  is one of vital factors to7/"
analyze the network cost. The function  is the probability generating function„’ “1!E/"
(PGF) of the number of attacked block  at the prior moment of exceeding moreE/"
than a half of the total nodes . The probability distribution of  could be foundQ E/"
from (3.9) after obtaining the PGF. From (2.37),
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4.3. The Marginal Transform upon E/
The number of blocks which governed by an attacker at  is another vital factor to7/
analyze the network cost. The function  is the probability generating function„’ “1"E/
(PGF) of the number of attacked block  at the moment of exceeding more than aE/
half of the total nodes . The probability distribution of  could be found asQ E/
follows:
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after obtaining the PGF of . From (2.38),E/
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               4.63M ME L" "a b a b a b5 œ !ß 5 œ !Þß 1"
4.4. Linear Programming Practice
A network security in a private blockchain based service with the token offering is
considered in this subsection. Although the Blockchain network is designed to be
decentralized, the service provider should have at least enough power to avoid attacks
not only from outsiders but also from insiders. The 51 percent attack still could be
happened even in the private blockchain networks. As it is mentioned, the strategy for
managing the network reliability is for supporting the additional nodes to give the less
chance that an attacker catches blocks with false transactions. In the view point of the
service planning, this practice is atypical setup of taken offerings. The example in this
paper is targeting 100K users, 2M USD total token values and the cost of backup
nodes for the governance is 0.5 USD per an honest (backup) nodes (see Table 2):
Name Value Description
100,000 [User] Total number of the nodes in the network
2,000,000 [USD] (Target) total value of tokens (or co
Q
F ins) offered by ICO
0.5 [USD] Cost for reserving additional nodes to avoid attacks (50 C/Node)
10 [Blocks] Total number of
- œ † Q
E
! !
„c d!  blocks that changed by an attacker at 
150 [Blocks] Total number of blocks that changed by an honest node at 
7
„ 7
!
! !
Ð œ !Ñ
L Ð œ !Ñc d
Table 2. Initial conditions for the cost function
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Since, the model of the  has been analytically solved,Blockchain Governance Game
the values for the cost function and the calculations of the probability distributions are
straight forward (see Table 3).
Name Formula Description
(2.38), (3.6) Probability that an attacker catches the blocks more than a half at 
(2.38), (3.6) Proba
;
;
!
"
7/
! bility that an attacker catches after adding reserved nodes
The portion of additional nodes for blockchain protection
(3.3) The
!
!

‡
 portion of the reserved nodes for minimizing the cost
(2.37), (3.8) The probability that an attacker is not succeed at :E "" 7
¶
/a b! Total (3.7) The total cost function for the enhanced blockchain network
Table 3. Calculated values from the equations
Let us assume some of values including , and  are already obtained after the; : ;! "E" !
calculations. It is noted that the purpose of this section only demonstrates how to
structure the Linear Programing (LP) model to optimize the cost. These values are
directly applied into the optimization model and described by the following LP model:
              Objective 3.7a b
                            min 4.64Y œ ¶ !a b a bTotal
              Subject to a b3.3
                            !   Þ-F†; -
!
!
! a b4.65
The total cost  could be minimized by given . As it is mentioned in Table 3,¶ ! !a bTotal
the parameter  is the portion that a defender (a service provider) reserves nodes to!
protect the network from an attacker. The below illustration (Fig. 1) is atypical graph
of an optimal result by using the  based on the givenBlockchain Governance Game
conditions (see Table 2). For this example, the optimal cost is 59.6K USD when the
defender reserve the 9.5% of total nodes which is 9,500 reserved nodes for managing
the risk from attacks.
Fig. 1. Optimization Example for the Blockchain Governance Game
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The moment of releasing the additional nodes will be the time  when is one step7/"
prior than the time when an attacker catches more than half of the whole blocks (i.e.,
7/).
5. CONCLUSION
The objective of this paper is establishing the theoretical framework of the Blockchain
Governance Game with the explicit equations for developing the Blockchain network
security for avoiding the attacks of the decentralized networks. The core parts of the
research including the proof of the Theorem 1 (BGG-1), the analytic functionals for
the decision making parameters and the special case are fully deployed in this paper.
This research will be helpful for whom considers the Initial Coin Offering (ICO) or
launching a new blockchain based service with the network security enhancement.
The  could be enhanced by gathering all related dataBlockchain Governance Game
from real networks and setting up the initial parameters based on the real measured
data is one of ways to enhance the BGG as a future research topic.
REFERENCES
Armknecht, F., Karame, G.  and et. al. (2015), Ripple: Overview and Outlook, Lecture Notes in
  , Springer, Berlin, Germany,  pp. 163-180.Computer Science 9229
Andrychowicz, M., Dziembowski, S. and et. al. (2015), On the Malleability of Bitcoin Transactions,
 Lecture Notes in Computer Science  , pp. 1-18.8976
Antonopoulos, A. M. (2017), Mastering Bitcoin: Programming the Open Blockchain, 2nd Ed., O'Reilly,
 Sebastopol, CA.
Back, A. (2002),   hashcash.org, retrieved fromHashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure,
 http://www.hashcash.org/papers/hashcash.pdf
Beikverdi, A. and Song, J. (2015) , Trend of centralization in Bitcoin's distributed network,
 Proceedings of The 16th IEEE/ACIS International Conference, pp. 1-6.
Decker, C. and Wattenhofer, R. (2013),  IEEE P2PInformation propagation in the Bitcoin network,
 2013 Proceedings, pp. 1-10.
Dshalalow, J. H. (1995) , ,  CRC Press, Boca Raton,First excess level process Advances in Queueing,
 FL, pp 244-261.
Dshalalow, J. H. and Ke, H. -J. (2009),  ,  ,Layers of noncooperative games 71 Nonlinear Analysis
 pp. 283-291.
Eyal, I. and Sirer, E. (2014),  Majority Is Not Enough: Bitcoin Mining Is Vulnerable, Lecture Notes
 in Computer Science 8437, pp. 436-454.
Eyal, I., Gencer, A. E. and et. al. (2016),   Bitcoin-NG: A Scalable Blockchain Protocol, The 13th
 USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, March 16-18, CA,
 pp. 45-59.
Garay, J., Kiayias, A. and Leonardos, N. (2015) , The Bitcoin Backbone Protocol: Analysis and
 Applications, 9057  , pp. 281-310.Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Hirai, Y. (2017),  Defining the Ethereum Virtual Machine for Interactive Theorem Provers, The
 21st Financial Cryptography Workshops, Sliema, Malta, April 7, pp. 520-535.
Kim, W. (2018a),  ( in Korean), retrieved fromBitcoin, Blockchain Mechanism and Its Evolution
 http://www.itfind.or.kr/publication/regular/weeklytrend/weekly/list.do?selectedId=1032
Kim, Y. (2018b),  retrieved fromBlockchain: Ideal and Reality,
 https://www.blockchainhub.kr/bbs/board.php?bo_table=lecture&wr_id=1879
Laurie, B. and Clayton, R. (2004),  , retreived from"Proof-of-Work" Proves Not to Work
 https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/proofwork.pdf
Luu, L., Teutsch, J.  R. and et. al. (2015), Demystifying Incentives in the Consensus Computer,
 Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications
 Security, New York, NY, pp. 706-719.
Nakamoto, S. (2009),  , retrieved fromBitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System
 http://www.bitcoin.org
Narayanan, A. and  Clar, J. (2017),  Bitcoin's Academic Pedigree, Magazine Communications of the  
 ACM 12, pp. 36-45.60:
13
Poelstra, A. (2015),  , retreived fromOn Stake and Consensus
 https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/pos.pdf
Weiss, M. and Corsi, E. (2018),    ,Bitfury: Blockchain for Government, 9-818-031HBP Case
 29 pages.
Wood, G. (2018),  Ehereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Transaction Ledger by
 Byzantium, 69351d5Ethereum Yellow Paper , 39 pages.
Yli-Huumo, J.,  Ko, D. and et. al. (2016), Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?
 A Systematic Review, 11:  10, 27 pages.PLoS ONE
